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Attitudes toward economic regulation in the United States have, since
colonial times, been influenced by an almost schizophrenic oscillation
between dirigiste and laissez-faire ideology. The laissez-faire tradition
maintains that within a legal system providing elementary guarantees against
force and fraud, business enterprise should be allowed the maximum possible
freedom. The dirigiste tradition, on the other hand, recommends government
intervention in a variety of situations, including those where the social return
may exceed the private rate of return to research and development spending,
in cases of natural monopoly, or where a firm has erected barriers to entry that
give it effective control over bottlenecks and the ability to extract rents from
them. Direct government economic influence on the telegraph industry over
its roughly fourteen decade history reflects this schizophrenia. Laissez-faire
ideology helped forestall intervention when it might have been beneficial.
Dirigiste ideology helped bring about regulatory intervention when allowing
a sick industry a natural death might have been better policy.
A NEW COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY
Many observers think of the era of modem telecommunications as
beginning with the invention of the telephone by Alexander Graham Bell in
1876. But it was the magnetic telegraph that brought us into the modem era,
with its ability, in principle, to send data as fast as electrons could move along
wires.' Throughout the early nineteenth century, Americans and others were
fascinated with the possibility of sending information over long distances
* Remarks prepared for the Second Telecommunication Policy and Law Symposium,
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faster than horses could ride or ships could sail, or, as the nineteenth century
progressed, locomotives could travel. This hunger for fast communication is
reflected in the fact that as of 1820, forty-five U.S. newspapers had
incorporated the word "telegraph" in their mastheads.2 So when the first line
began operation in the United States in 1844, there was no novelty to the idea
of telegraphy itself.
But the technology that gave birth to the industry at mid-century was
radically different from what most citizens had anticipated. The telegraphs
people had in mind prior to Morse's demonstration, did not, in general, make
use of the principles of either electricity or magnetism. Throughout the first
four decades of the nineteenth century, state of the art technology was optical,
its highest achievement reflected in the French system using semaphores,
telescopes, and code books pioneered by Claude Chappe in the last decade of
the eighteenth century.3 Optical telegraphy was a well-developed and proven
technology, albeit one with limited bandwidth, inability to transmit at night,
and vulnerability to fog, snow, rain, or temperature inversion. Nevertheless,
at its peak, Chappe telegraphs, government owned and operated, extended over
5,000 kilometers of French territory.
Americans were familiar with semaphores, since they were used in
commercial centers such as New York or San Francisco to announce the
impending arrival of ships - thus San Francisco's Telegraph Hill. Beginning
in 1807 and continuing through the next three decades, there were repeated
attempts to get Congress to vote funds to build and operate a U.S. system using
French technology. The last effort took place in 1837 and was endorsed by
President Jackson's Postmaster General, Amos Kendall. The proposal
anticipated a line of semaphores along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts from New
York to New Orleans.4 The political viability of the system was based on
demand by New Orleans merchants to get the latest money market rates from
New York and by New York merchants to obtain the latest cotton prices from
the entrep6t at the mouth of the Mississippi.
Samuel Morse lobbied energetically againstthis proposal, angling instead
for federal funds to support his own radically different design. Today, optical
telegraphs are considered of interest mostly to antiquarians, boy scouts and
midshipmen at the Naval Academy, and we take for granted the use for long
2. See RICHARD JOHN, SPREADING THE NEWS: THE AMERICAN POSTAL SYSTEM FROM
FRANKLIN TO MORSE 87 (1995).
3. See Alexander J. Field, French Optical Telegraphy, 1793-1855: Hardware,
Software, and Administration, 35 TECH. AND CULTURE, April 1994, at 315.
4. See TELEGRAPHS FOR THE UNITED STATES: LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE
TREASURY TRANSMITTING A REPORT UPON THE SUBJECT OF A SYSTEM OF TELEGRAPHS FOR THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. No. 25-15 (1837).
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distance communication purposes ofnonvisual portions of the electromagnetic
spectrum. But at the time, semaphores were a well-established technology,
whereas electrical telegraphy had about it the same aura as did practitioners of
mesmerism and proponents of perpetual motion machines: these were
technologies prudent legislators and investors steered clear of
But Morse persisted, and he, not the proponents of the semaphores, got
a government grant of $30,000 to build a demonstration project. When he
constructed a line from Washington to Baltimore in 1844 and transmitted to
Washington the results of the Whig nominating convention in Baltimore in
advance of the arrival by train of the information, it swayed some critics. But
apparently not enough. Morse had assumed from the start that a telegraph
system would be publicly owned and operated, and that he would make his
money by selling his patent rights to the government. This he promptly
offered to do, and the offer was rejected. One reason: between April and
October 1845, revenue on the Washington to Baltimore line was a little over
$400, whereas operating costs were over $4,000.' Another reason: defaults on
state owned and operated railroad and canal projects in the 1830s left a bad
taste in the mouths of some federal legislators for government-owned internal
improvements, particularly those that risked being a drag on the Treasury. In
any event, federal funding for internal improvements had been a contentious
political issue at least since Gallatin's 1808 plan.
CHAOS, CONSOLIDATION, AND CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN
The next two decades were a period of rapid, and at times chaotic,
growth of the telegraph industry under private ownership.6 In this period,
systems were set up based not only on the Morse patents, but also on those of
Bain, House, and Hughes. Some conservative investors stayed away because
of fears the government might change its mind and step in to build or acquire
its own system. Many of the fledgling firms faced difficulties raising cash,
and thus acquired assets or other companies using stock, laying the foundation
for later complaints about "watering." Eventually, in a process culminating in
1866, shakeout occurred with consolidation under one firm.
Congress did not adopt a completely hands-off attitude during this
period. For strategic reasons, the government desired a telegraphic link to the
West Coast. Western Union indirectly received $400,000 of public funds -
$40,000 per year for ten years - in exchange for government access to the line,
5. See REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, DECEMBER 1, 1845, S. Doc. 29-I, at
860 (1845).
6. See ROBERT LUTHER THOMPSON, WIRING A CONTINENT: THE HISTORY OF THE
TELEGRAPH INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1832-1866 (1947).
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as well as subventions from the California legislature to encourage
construction of a transcontinental telegraph. Construction was done through
companies nominally distinct but actually under the control of Western
Union.7 The completion of the line in 1861, eight years before the golden
spike was driven at Promontory Point, spelled the quick demise of the short-
lived Pony Express.
Congress watched the consolidation of the telegraph industry with
growing unease. Whether or not Western Union was a natural monopoly,
there is little question that it exercised monopoly power over national
telegraphic traffic for at least two decades. This period extends roughly from
1866 to 1885, when the Postal Telegraph Company, subsequently part of ITT,'
entered as a competitor, and the telephone arguably began to serve as a
competing technology within some heavily-trafficked intercity routes,
particularly the Boston - New York - Philadelphia corridor.
In 1866, the Senate queried the Postmaster General on the advisability
of establishing a government-run telegraph system. When a report
discouraging direct ownership returned, Congress passed the Post Roads Act
of 1866. Some of its provisions were explicitly intended to encourage
competition in the telegraph industry. In particular, the Act specified that any
telegraph company accepting its terms would be granted rights of way across
public domain, post roads, and navigable streams, and the privilege of taking
land, timber, and stone from the public domain to maintain stations and
facilities. Western Union, along with other companies, promptly accepted the
conditions of the Act, thus providing new entrants no competitive advantage
over the industry leader. The Act did nothing to restrict Western Union's
growing monopoly power.
Between 1870 and 1896, at least twelve proposals emerged from
congressional committees for government participation in the sector. The U.S.
postal service, run by the federal government, as well as European systems, in
which both post and telegraph systems were government-owned, provided
examples that fueled political pressure for nationalization, for government
entry as a competitor, or for government subsidy of a competitor.
Complaints levied against Western Union echoed many of those raised
against railroads at the time. High rates, of course, figured heavily. Average
message rates in the United States fell from $1.09 in 1867 to $0.30 in 1898,
7. See H.H. Goldin, Governmental Policy and the Domestic Telegraph Industry, 7 J.
ECON. HIST., May 1947, at 53, 55.
8. Postal Telegraph got its name because of repeated government proposals to strike
a deal offering space in post offices for a private telegraph system competitive with Western
Union. The deal was never consummated but Postal Telegraph liked the name, even though the
firm was as private an entity as Western Union.
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although the economy-wide deflation over this period would have accounted
for about half of this decline. Whatever one's views of the legitimacy of
Western Union's rate structure, however, there is consensus that, as a result of
it, much more so than was true in Europe, the telegraph in the United States
remained predominantly an instrument of commercial rather than individual
household use.
Other complaints included poor service: errors of transmission, delayed
messages, and violation of secrecy; the ability of stock speculators to obtain
preferential access to the telegraph; free telegraph privileges granted to public
officials to influence their votes; discrimination among regions and
communities with respect to rates; long-term contracts with press agencies,
such as the Associated Press, and with hotels and railroads that created barriers
to entry for potential new entrants; and unfairness to workers, through long
hours, low wages, and poor conditions, and to stockholders through stock
watering. Perhaps the most damning complaint was that of technological
unprogressiveness, particularly in comparison with some of the European
systems.
According to the company's own reports, of every dollar of revenue
taken in between 1865 and 1885, $0.30 - 0.40 was net profit. A Senate
committee estimated in 1884 that the reproduction cost of the company's
capital was approximately $30 million. Between 1866 and 1899, the company
distributed about $40 million in cash dividends and $57 million in stock
dividends.9 For a period of time in the nineteenth century, Western Union was
a veritable gold mine, a blue chip stock; its stranglehold on fast intercity
competition generated a large, steady and predictable revenue flow with which
executives were generally reluctant to tamper by introducing too many
changes. During these years, it would have been a prime target for federal
antitrust policy, had one existed. By the end of the century, however, the
telegraph industry, which by and large consisted of Western Union, had
already begun its long downhill slide.
In a private sector replay of what was arguably a governmental error in
1845, Western Union turned down an offer to buy the Bell telephone patent
rights in 1877. "What use," Western Union's CEO said famously, "could this
company make of an electrical toy?"'0 The company soon after tried to undo
its mistake, changing course rapidly when it discovered that some of its
employees at one of its subsidiaries, the Gold and Stock Exchange company,
had ripped out printing telegraphs and replaced them with telephones.
Developing its hardware on the basis of patents other than those held by Bell,
9. See Goldin, supra note 7, at 58.
10. HERBERT CASSON, THE HISTORY OF THE TELEPHONE 59 (1910).
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Western Union built telephone systems in fifty-five cities. Its patent war with
Bell, however, ended badly, with Bell triumphant. As part of the peace
settlement, Western Union agreed to withdraw from the telephone business,
with Bell acquiring its existing systems.
There is little doubt that as telephone networks were extended, there were
real efficiencies to be reaped by having one company offer both telephone and
telegraph service. In most instances, Western Union did not place terminals
in users' homes or offices; messengers carried the telegram the final mile, a
distance, of course, that telephone wires increasingly traversed. In 1909, in
what must have been a historically humiliating turn of events, AT&T acquired
Western Union.
Western Union's technology at the time was little changed from the
1860s. AT&T moved rapidly to modernize hardware by initiating a program
of installing automatic multiplexing printers that would take until 1915 to
complete. It introduced an innovative rate schedule, offering preferential rates
for non-urgent communications that could, for example, be sent overnight.
And it brought Western Union compensation policies more directly in
alignment with those at AT&T. But driven by fears of economic
concentration, the Wilson administration threatened antitrust action. Bell was
forced to divest itself of Western Union in 1913, giving up the synergies
possible through joint operation. In retrospect, this can be seen as another
policy error, perhaps well intentioned, but an error nonetheless. Two decades
later, the newly formed Federal Communications Commission would find
itself with regulatory responsibility for a relatively undiversified firm in a
dying industry."
Pressures to nationalize the telegraph system in the United States
continued. On January 12, 1914, the Postmaster General transmitted to the
Senate a report recommending nationalization, basing its recommendation on
a comparison of rates and services in the United States as compared with those
characterizing telegraph systems elsewhere in the world. The proposal
advocated nationalization of the telephone industry as well, but the
international comparisons contained in the report are much more unflattering
to U.S. telegraphy than to U.S. telephony.
2
The telegraph system was in fact nationalized shortly thereafter, although
only for a two-year period coinciding with United States involvement in World
War I. The system, consisting mostly of the assets of Western Union and its
smaller competitor, Postal Telegraph, was returned to private ownership in
11. See Carrie Glasser, Some Problems in the Development of the Communications
Industry, 35 AM. ECON. REv., Sept. 1945, at 585.
12. See A.N. Holcombe, Public Ownership of Telegraphs and Telephones, 28 Q.J.
ECON., May 1914, at 581.
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1919 and muddled through the prosperity of the 1920s, benefitting in part from
initiatives begun during the short period of AT&T ownership. But when the
Depression hit, the parlous state of the industry became all too evident.
THE DEPRESSION, COMPETITIVE THREATS, AND
THE ONSET OF EFFECTIVE REGULATION
In 1910, the Interstate Commerce Commission had been given formal
authority to regulate the communications sector. But the ICC was preoccupied
with issues in the transportation sector, and in fact there was no effective
regulation of the telegraph industry until the Communications Act of 1934,
which created the Federal Communication Commission. By this point, the
telegraph industry, unlike telephone and radio, was an economic invalid whose
rationale, aside from providing employment to its workers, was increasingly
unclear. The industry had, for a time, survived competition from the telephone
because of its competitive advantage for long distance intercity
communication, and because of its provision of a written record of a
transmission. But it now faced increased intermodal competition on several
fronts.
The telephone became an increasingly formidable competitor for long
distance traffic in the twentieth century. In the nineteenth century, before the
invention of the loading coil, better cabling, and de Forest's triode, direct
phone conversation could not take place over a distance of more than about
thirty miles. "Long distance" communication by telephone involved, literally,
human repeaters. New technologies in the twentieth century altered these
limitations. Direct New York to Chicago service began in 1904, New York to
San Francisco in 1915, and the use of multiplexing technologies and other
advances dramatically increased the bandwidth of existing cabling,
contributing to reductions in message costs. By the 1930s, intercity telephony
was a very serious threat to telegraphy in situations where quick
communication was desired.
Telegraphy's other competitive strength was provision of a written
record of a transaction. In 1931, AT&T, which had been offering private line
telegraph service for several decades, introduced teletypewriter exchange
service (TWX). Business customers could now compose messages on a
typewriter keyboard. Similar equipment at the receiving end printed out the
message, providing close to real-time two way written communication. TWX
was a "torn tape" system: switching was achieved by reperforating paper tapes
and sending the information down different wires. The system is a direct
ancestor of today's ubiquitous electronic mail capability.
A second threat came from the air. Government subsidies to the
fledgling air transport industry in the form of contracts for airmail carriage cut
2001]
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deeply into Western Union's overnight letter traffic, which, based on the
pricing initiative begun during the brief period of AT&T ownership, had
become a valuable source of revenue. Western Union also faced limited
competition from radio telegraphy. Thus on the ground, via airplanes, and
through the ether, the telegraph industry was under attack. The rationale for
the industry's separate wired network was increasingly questionable, given
technology that could multiplex telegraph data along with telephone calls on
the same wire or, eventually, via microwave.
Western Union's one competitor, Postal Telegraph, went into
receivership between 1935 and 1940, and survived the Depression only with
the infusion of $13.5 million of taxpayer funds from the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation. The FCC would subsequently encourage and bless the
absorption by Western Union of Postal Telegraph in 1943.
In retrospect, and it is always easier to make these arguments in
retrospect, a strong public policy rationale can be provided for government
ownership, rate and service regulation, or antitrust or subsidy action to
encourage competition, roughly from the mid 1860s through the early 1890s.
But federal antitrust policy dates from the end of this period, and effective
regulation did not begin until 1934. Its history under the FCC included mostly
approvals of rate increases, support for consolidation and service cutbacks,
and concern for protecting the investments of stockholders and the jobs of
employees in a declining industry. These are not the actions that would have
been cheered by an aroused public in the 1870s or 1880s.
Peak telegraph traffic in the United States was recorded in 1945, but this
gives an illusory picture of the industry's health. For historical reasons, in part
because of their high cost, telegrams continued for a number of years to pack
an emotional impact lacking in a letter or a telephone call. Thus, the families
of the over 400,000 U.S. soldiers killed in combat would be notified by
telegram, and households used telegrams to send messages to which they
wished urgent attention paid. But business use of the system, which had
provided over ninety percent of the revenue in the nineteenth century, was
shrinking.
CONCLUSION
In the 1943 agreement authorizing the merger of Postal Telegraph with
Western Union, the FCC had encouraged and anticipated the sale by AT&T
of its TWX system to Western Union. The intent was to provide the merged
monopoly with at least one service which appeared at the time to have some
growth potential, but AT&T stalled. In 1962, Western Union entered the
teletypewriter transmission business on its own by introducing to the United
States TELEX, a competitor to TWX that had originally been developed in
[Vol. 2:245
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Europe. In 1970, AT&T finally agreed to sell TWX to Western Union,
although the company never could get its two teletypewriter systems to talk
with each other.
AT&T's timing could not have been better. The Internet was born in
1969, with the first e-mail messages sent in 1971. With the growth of these
systems, and the ubiquity of facsimile transmission over telephone lines, the
demand for teletypewriter services withered. With the benefit of hindsight, we
can now see clearly that the telegraph industry had been in decline at least
since 1900. Whereas its Siamese twin, the railroad, was eventually able to
survive intermodal competition in the twentieth century by giving up
passenger transport, embracing containerization, and concentrating on bulk
freight, Western Union was never able to carve out a new competitive niche.
In 1949, the company ended its long-standing agreements with the railroads,
giving up all claims to ownership of poles, wire or equipment. The
development was more symbolic than substantive, but a visible sign, for those
who wished to read it, of an industry entering a long period of senescence and
decay, one prolonged by FCC ministrations.
Whenever an organization has persisted for any period of time, there is
a natural reluctance to see it vanish. Organizational culture has developed,
public awareness and good will may be important assets, and employees and
managers have made investments specific to the firm. These must be written
off if the organization dissolves, and the same may be true for some of the
value of physical capital employed. But when the original economic rationale
for a firm no longer exists, and when it has been unable to redeploy its
organizational capabilities to other missions, it is sometimes worse from the
standpoint of both public and private policy to allow it to persist. Private
corporations need sunset provisions as much as governmental organizations
and task forces do.
Telegraph service in the United States limped along for four more
decades. In 1988, the Western Union Telegraph company finally threw in the
towel, selling off its international private line business to a Swiss Company,
its Westar satellite to GM Hughes Electronics, and its business services group,
- teletypewriters - back to AT&T. The Western Union corporation today
focuses almost exclusively on money transfers, its original businesses eclipsed
by rapidly changing technologies, its regulatory history a cautionary tale.
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